Indiana Law Journal
Volume 48

Issue 2

Article 8

Winter 1973

Jurisdictional Reach Under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act:
Littlejohn Says More, Others Say Less
Loren K. Collier
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Collier, Loren K. (1973) "Jurisdictional Reach Under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Littlejohn Says
More, Others Say Less," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 48 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol48/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

JURISDICTIONAL REACH UNDER § 2(a) OF THE ROBINSONPATMAN ACT: LITTLEJOHN SAYS MOORE, OTHERS SAY LESS
During the early part of this century large manufacturer-suppliers
drove their smaller competitors out of business by reducing prices in regions where both firms operated. The Clayton Act,1 passed in 1914, was
designed to eliminate these primary-line problems of predatory price-cut2
ting.
During the next twenty years, manufacturer-suppliers took advantage of the rapid growth of large chainstores to engage in secondary-line
discrimination.' In the late 20's and early 30's, chainstores in the United
States nearly tripled their share of total sales,' and the mortality rate
among independent retailers was perhaps as high as ten per cent a year.'
This movement was facilitated by the manufacturer-suppliers who, attracted by the large wholesale purchasing powers of chainstores, sold
goods to these purchasers on terms more favorable than those given to
smaller retailers.' Thus, chainstores were able to cut their prices within
the smaller retailers' market areas and force many competing firms out
of business.
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act'
was passed to expand the Clayton Act's jurisdiction to include secondaryline discrimination

:'

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 14-27, 44 (1970).
2. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1960) ; C. AusTIN, PRIcE DisCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 11 (2d rev.
ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN]. See also D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT 12 (1964).
3. Essentially, primary-level competition is that between manufacturer-suppliers,
and secondary-level competition is that between common purchasers of a manufacturersupplier. For an excellent explanation of the distinction between primary- and secondaryline competition and discrimination, see F. KINTNER, A ROBINSoN-PATMAN PRA.MR 9396 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KINTNER].
4. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 7 (1955).
5. Id. at 12-13. It should be noted that this statistic does not reflect an absolute
decline in numbers, but rather a high "turnover" of independent retailers. Although ten
per cent of the independent retailers may have gone out of business in a given year, they
were replaced, to a certain extent, by others who would in turn fall victim to the chain
store phenomenon.
6. See AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 11; T. BECKMAN & H. NOLEN, THE CHAINSTORE
PROBLEM 43-44 (1938) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9078 (1935) (remarks of Congressman Patman).
7. 15 U S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Robinson-Patman
Act or the Act]. The Robinson-Patman Act is technically an amendment to § 2 of the
Clayton Act as originally enacted, Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730. For this
reason one must look to the Clayton Act for the definition of such terms as "person"
and "commerce."
8. See AusTiN, supra note 2, at 11; F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBniNSON-PATMAN Act 6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RowE].
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[I] t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers .

. ,

where

either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce.
This language includes the Clayton Act's two original jurisdictional requirements-the seller must be "engaged in commerce" and the price
discrimination must occur "in the course of such commerce"--as well
as a further requirement that the purchases involved must be "in commerce."
Courts have consistently held that this third jurisdictional requirement does, in fact, necessitate a showing that at least one of the discriminatory sales must occur in interstate commerce (i.e., cross a state
line)." However, the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Littlejohn v. Shell
Oil Co." dispensed with this requirement. Relying on Moore v. Mead's
Fine Bread Co.,"3 the Littlejohn court held that a complaint based on §
2(a) need not charge that an alleged discriminatory sale crossed a state
line."4 This decision will promote Robinson-Patman's legislative goals by
imposing civil liability on powerful national concerns which, until now,
have evaded § 2 (a) by limiting their local maunfacturing plants to intrastate sales.'"
THE MEANING OF MOORE

The plaintiff in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., the Supreme
Court's most recent decision on § 2(a)'s jurisdictional requirements,
was an intrastate wholesale bakery supplier located near Clovis, New
Mexico. Defendant Mead's was also a bakery goods supplier, having a
large intrastate business in New Mexico, along with one interstate truck
route into Farwell, Texas. Mead's was part of a large family of corpora9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
10. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act provided in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different
purchasers .

.

. ,

where the effect of such discrimination may be to substan-

tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730.
11. See, e.g., Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir.
1969) ; Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967) ; Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 157-58 (D. Minn. 1967).
12. 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rehearing granted, 5 TRADE REG. RxP. (Newv
Court Decisions) ff 74,316, at 93,470 (5th Cir., Jan. 2, 1973).
13. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
14. 456 F.2d at 226.
15. See KINTNER, supra note 3, at 86-87; cf. AUsTIN, supra note 2, at 17; RovE,
supra note 8, at 81.
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tions with interlocking ownership and management, operating throughout Texas and New Mexico.:' The defendent cut prices on intrastate
sales in the Clovis area, 17 but maintained higher prices on interstate sales
into Texas.
The lower court in Moore held that to show a violation of § 2(a)
a plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant made interstate sales,
but also that the alleged discriminatory sale which undercut the plaintiff
crossed state lines.
Here, although Mead was engaged in [interstate] commerce,
the sales made in the course of such commerce were not the
means for the elimination of the local competitor. The means
for the achievement of the local purpose did not extend beyond
state lines. 8
On appeal the Supreme Court struck down the lower court's interpretation of § 2(a)'s jurisdictional requirements.
[T]he practices in the present case are also included
within the scope of the antitrust laws. We have here an interstate industry increasing its domain through outlawed competitive practices. The victim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate transactions are used to destroy him.
But the beneficiary is an interstate business; the treasury used
to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local,
sources which include not only respondent but also a group of
interlocked companies engaged in the same line of business;
and the prices on the interstate sales, both by respondent and
by other Mead companies, are kept high while the local prices
are lowered.

.

.

.

The profits made in interstate activities

would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.'"
This language leaves the scope of § 2 (a) unclear. The Court seems
to suggest that the existence of an interstate combine capable of underwriting local discriminatory price cuts satisfies § 2(a)'s jurisdictional
prerequisites even without discriminatory interstate sales. However, the
defendant in Moore did operate an interstate truck route. While the
interstate sales from this route constituted only a small fraction of the
16. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 20-24, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S.
115 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Reply Brief].
17. The order to cut prices in the Clovis area was given by E. E. Corcoram, a
Vice-President of all four Mead corporations. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 16,

at 22.
18. Mead's Fine Bread Co v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 1953).
19. 348 U.S. at 119.

296
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defendant's total sales,2" they were technically sufficient to bring the defendant's selling activity within the jurisdictional requirements of §
2 (a)." Therefore, perhaps the Supreme Court merely held that although
a defendant's undercutting sale need not have been interstate, at least
one interstate sale, whether it be the higher or lower-priced sale, must be
shown.22 This conclusion would be consistent with other language in
Moore:
[T]hose sections [§§ 2 (a) and (3)] on their face seem to
cover the instant case. Respondent is engaged in commerce,
selling bread both locally and interstate. 3
On the other hand, if the defendant's few interstate sales were alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the Court's strong emphasis on the existence of a large, interstate combine is superfluous. 4
Since Moore, circuit courts, interpreting Moore's concern for Mead's
interstate nature as dicta 2 5 have repeatedly concluded that a § 2 (a) violation requires a showing that at least one of the sales complained of has
crossed state lines. On at least eight separate occasions the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari on decisions interpreting § 2(a) in this manner."
20. Testimony in the trial court revealed that interstate sales into Farwell, Texas,
represented only 1.7 per cent of the Clovis company's total sales for the period in ques-

tion. Record at 423-24, Moore, d/b/a Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., Civil
No. 1457 (D.N.M., filed Dec. 8, 1952).
21. In attempting to ascertain the holding in Moore, it is significant to note that the
"'commerce' test of the statute [Robinson-Patman Act] is qualified by an implicit exemption for interstate transactions of a deminimus dimension." RowE, supra note 8, at
78. Therefore, the position that Moore was based upon Mead's interstate sales is certainly questionable.
22. This interpretation of Moore is suggested in K-INTNER, supra note 3, at 81
ROWE, supra note 8, at 79.
23. 348 U.S. at 118.
24. The conclusion that the Court's decision was based on the existence of an interstate combine capable of underwriting local discriminatory price cuts, and not the
negligible number of interstate sales by one member of the combine, is supported by the
following language:
We have here an interstate industry . . .; the beneficiary is an interstate business; the treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate . . .
sources which include not only respondent but a group of interlocked companies. . . . The profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the
losses of local price-cutting campaigns.
348 U.S. at 119.
25. See KINTNER, npra note 3, at 82. The Littlejohn majority even admits that
the language of Moore upon which it relies has been considered dicta by several courts.
Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 396 U.S. 1042 (1970), denying cert. to 414
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 396 U.S. 901
(1969), denying cert. to 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Abramson v Colonial Oil Co., 393
U.S. 831, denying cert. to 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Cream Crest-Blanding Dairies,
Inc. v. National Dairy Products Corp., 387 U.S. 930, denying cert. to 370 F.2d 332 (6th
Cir. 1967) ; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 382 U.S. 959, denying cert. to 348 F.2d 674
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Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co." has challenged these precedents.
LITTLEJOHN V. SHELL OIL

The plaintiff in Littlejohn owned and operated on independent gasoline service station in Dallas County, Texas. Shell Oil's 28 Houston refinery allegedly sold gasoline to one of its retail stations which was in
direct competition with Littlejohn (the station was in the same block as
the plaintiff's) at lower prices than it charged other Shell stations in the
Dallas area. The favored station, in turn, sold to the public at lower prices
than those charged by other Shell stations. Littlejohn alleged that these
sales violated § 2(a).11
Since Littlejohn had failed to allege that the defendant's Houston
refinery made interstate sales, the district court granted the defendant summary judgment.3" Littlejohn had been unable to discover any interstate
(5th Cir. 1965) ; Jones v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 379 U.S. 965 (1965), denying cert. to 334
F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Products Corp., 373
U.S. 934 (1963), dcnying cert. to 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir 1962) ; Central Ice Cream Co.
v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 368 U.S. 829, denying cert. to 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1961).
27. 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Although American and Sooner Oil Companies were also defendants in Littlejohn, it is sufficient to relate only Shell's activities for purposes of analyzing the court's
opinion.
29. Brief for Appellant at 23, Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1972) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. Thus, Littlejohn was not only complaining of the wholesale sales to his Shell retail competitor, but also of the competitor's
retail sales to the public which undercut the price at which Littlejohn was selling.
30. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 326 F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Tex. 1971). While the
district court's primary concern was the interstate sales issue (and the lack of such sales
was the only ground for summary judgment dealt with on appeal), the district court felt
that Littlejohn was without a cause of action for at least two other reasons. First,
Littlejohn had failed to show that the defendants controlled retail prices. Id. at 47.
Second, and most significant, the court doubted that Littlejohn had standing to sue under
§ 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act; the court reasoned that he was not harmed by
secondary-line discrimination as that term is traditionally defined because he did not
purchase from the same supplier as the competitor of whose undercutting activity he was
complaining. Id. at 47-48. See also Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). Thus, the Fifth Circuit's reversal of
the district court arguably implies that such secondary-line discrimination (and primaryline discrimination as well, since Littlejohn did not compete with Shell at the supplier
level) need not be alleged in order for the plaintiff to have standing under the RobinsonPatman Act.
Although courts may be willing to accept the position set forth in this note (i.e.,
that the interstate sale requirement should be dispensed with when there is a predatory
price-cutting scheme underwritten by a national concern engaged in interstate commerce), it is unlikely that they will also extend the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage to
plaintiffs who are injured by neither type of discrimination which § 2(a) has been
traditionally thought to prohibit. Nevertheless, a strong argument for such an extension in the Littlejohn context can be made because Littlejohn is the type of plaintiff
which the Act was designed to protect. That is to say, Robinson-Patman was concerned
with small retailers who could not compete with their large competitors because the
small retailers were forced to pay more than their competitors for goods purchased from
a common supplier. See note 6 supra & text accompanying. While Littlejohn did not
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sales within the time permitted by the district court and thus his appeal to
the Fifth Circuit was based on a plea for additional time."' The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that more time for discovery
should be permitted. lHlowever, the court went on to say that the plaintiff's
discovery need not be directed at uncovering a discriminatory interstate
sale. According to the court, Littlejohn's
complaint under the Robinson-Patman Act need not allege that
one of the sales involved was interstate in character as long as it
charges that interstate sales were used to underwrite allegedly
discriminatory intrastate price-cutting tactics. 2
This holding was based on that language in Moore which emphasized the
jurisdictional importance of large, interstate combines which finance and
underwrite intrastate price cutting through interstate sales."3
purchase from the same supplier as his Shell competitor, he was driven from business
because he could not obtain price cuts from his supplier which were comparable to those
being "temporarily" afforded his Shell competitor. If the common supplier criterion
is strictly adhered to, it will mean, in most instances, that the only party capable of
complaining of activities such as those in Littlejohn would be a retailer who did not get
the same price cut as his retailing competitor. The prospect of a retailer bringing a
price discrimination suit against a major supplier who has given him a dealership or
franchise is, at best, fanciful.
Extension of § 2(a) coverage to a plaintiff in Littlejohn's situation may also be
justified on the ground that such an extension would indirectly protect primary-line
competition, which remains a concern of the Robinson-Patman Act. FTC v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960). The scheme employed by Shell in Littlejohn,
if repeated throughout the nation, could seriously affect competition at the primary
level. Not only was Littlejohn driven from his business by this scheme, but his supplier lost a customer. Thus, while Shell is prohibited from discriminating on the primary level through means of predatory price-cutting to drive a competing supplier out
of business in a given area of the country, it may accomplish the same result by driving
the competitor's customers out of business one by one through the scheme employed in
Littlejohn.
31. Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 13-14. Counsel for Littlejohn did not
argue for the holding adopted by the Fifth Circuit. He only sought more time in which
to discover whether or not any interstate sales had been made from Shell's Houston
refinery, and his brief indicates agreement with the traditional § 2(a) jurisdictional requirement that at least one of the sales complained of must be "in interstate commerce."
See, e.g., id. at 26.
32. 456 F.2d 225, 226 (5th Cir. 1972). After making this statement, the court
continued:
We simply hold that the district court acted prematurely in foreclosing the plaintiff from further discovery regarding the interstate aspects of the defendants'
operations....
Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 229 (1972) (emphasis added). This language
makes it apparent that the discovery referred to was that required to show "interstate
underwriting" and not interstate sales.
33. Until the Supreme Court explicitly repudiates the above-quoted language
[the interstate underwriting language] from Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in
Moore, we believe that a Robinson-Patman Act plaintiff should be entitled to
proceed upon a theory that the interstate operations of the defendant or de-
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THE ARGUMENT FOR LITTLEJOHN

In searching for Congressional intent with respect to the Littlejohn
situation it must be observed that Congress possessed the power to enact
legislation with the broad jurisdictional requirements found by the court
in Littlejohn. 4 Whether or not Congress did so is uncertain. While
Littlejohn's interpretation of § 2(a) is unsupported by any post-Moore
decisions,"3 recourse to the Act's legislative history and to § 2's other
subsections arguably supports the Littlejohn opinion.
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of Littlejohn is simply
that it effects the basic purpose of Robinson-Patman. In light of the
draftsmen's stated concern for the plight of the small retailer, 6 it seems
unlikely that Congress did not desire to protect someone like Littlejohn.
Congress was concerned with small retailers being driven out of business
by large nationwide or regional retailers, 7 precisely what happened to
Littlejohn. Robinson-Patman was designed to cover the more subtle
methods of price discrimination, such as rebates and commissions, which
had been developed to evade the Clayton Act. 8 Therefore, the RobinsonPatman Act's expanded coverage should call for jurisdictional power at
least equal to that of the Clayton Act, which has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court not to require an interstate sale to establish jurisdiction. 9
fendants were used to 'underwrite' local discriminatory pricing practices.
456 F.2d at 229.
34. See AusTIn, supra note 2, at 15-16; Royal Farms, Inc. v. Piels Bros., Inc., 1971
Trade Cas. 89,877 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
35. See note 26 supra & text accompanying. See also Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v.
Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383
F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
36. "[T]he day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and
done quickly." Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend
the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945) (statement by Congressman Patman).
The backbone of . . . local enterprise is the local independent businessman . . It is a mistake to assume that he is less efficient just because he is
small ....
Yet his nonresident competitor . . . with the ability to absorb
losses, is able to . . . crush his [the small businessman's) superior efficiency
with no other weapons than those of greater size and the power of outside
resources.
80 CONG. Rec. 9416 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback).
37. For a general discussion of the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
C. EDWARDs, THE PICE DISCRMINATION LAW 29-30 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
EDWARDS].
Particularly significant is his comment: "It [the Act] expressed not a
concern to preserve free markets, but rather a concern to assure the survival of small
business." Id. at 12.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936) ; S. RE'. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936) ; ROWE, supra note 8, at 365. Cf. AuSTIN, siupra note 2, at 8-9;
ICINTNEP, supra note 3, at 30, 227.
39. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314-315 (1949). For the
differences between the jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act and the
Clayton Act, see notes 9 & 10 supra & text accompanying.
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It is uncertain whether Robinson-Patman's legislative history indicates an intent to make an interstate sale a jurisdictional requirement of
§ 2(a) when there is underwriting by a large, multi-state business.
Courts which have read § 2(a) to require at least one interstate sale
would disagree with this proposition, arguing that the jurisdictional
language of Robinson-Patman is far narrower in scope than the effect on
commerce test applicable under the Sherman Antitrust Act." In support
of this position, some commentators4 cite the fact that the Senate-House
Conference Committee struck a clause 42 in the original House bill which
would have adopted the "effect on commerce" criterion for RobinsonPatman jurisdiction:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether in commerce or
not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price.
where

.

.

.

such discrimination may substantially lessen com-

petition in commerce ....
However, when rejecting this language, the conferees did not expressly
state an intention to make interstate sales a minimum jurisdictional requirement of § 2(a)." Moreover, the discarded language represents an
extreme approach under which purely local transactions involving purely
local parties could have been reached by the Act. Rejection of such an
extreme does not imply acceptance of the opposite, i.e., requiring at least
one interstate sale. An equally plausible explanation of the conferees' disapproval is that they merely desired more stringent jurisdictional requirements than those of the Sherman Act. It can be argued that the court in
Littlejohn similarly recognized that Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act
jurisdictional requirements are not the same, thus admitting the jurisdictional necessity of relating an alleged discriminatory price-cut in some
way to interstate commerce. Its extensive reliance on Moore would indicate that it shares the Supreme Court's position on the necessity of showing, in the absence of an "in commerce" sale, that the defendant was
heavily engaged in interstate activity.
Internal inconsistencies in § 2 may also justify Littlejohn. Section
2 (c) 4 ' (prohibiting large chain buyers from exacting fictitious brokerage
40.

See Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1969) ;

Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 676 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959
(1965) ; Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 871 (1963) ; Lewis v.
Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
41. AusTI , supra note 2, at 15; RowE, supra note 8, at 78.
42. H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
43. H.R. 8442, 740th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1936).
44. H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970), which provides in part:
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fees) and § 2(d)"0 (prohibiting large purchasers from receiving promotion allowances and services) were enacted to reach more subtle methods of § 2(a) price discrimination. Neither of these sections has an interstate sale requirement. 8 This omission has been viewed as an argument
for reading § 2(a)'s "purchase . . . in commerce" clause as an additional jurisdictional requirement for that section.49 However, under this
interpretation, a seller could structure his operation to achieve the same
discriminatory result through direct price-cutting that would be outlawed
by §§ 2(c) and (d) if attempted through more subtle methods."0
Section 2(f)" 1 is another example of the Act's aberrant drafting.
This section imposes liability upon buyers accepting discriminatory prices
for which their sellers would be liable under § 2 (a)." Yet § 2(f)'s
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of six*
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase
of goods ...
Id. (emphasis added).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for
the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or
commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless
such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all
other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. See 80 CONG. REC. 6281, 6282 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan).
48. With respect to § 2(c), see Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). With respect to § 2(d), see
Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 971 (1964).
49. See KiNTNER, mspra note 3, at 80.
50. To illustrate, it will be assumed that a manufacturer-supplier has plants in
Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio, and that he does not sell outside of this three-state region.
If his plants in these three states sell only within the state in which they are located,
the manufacturer-supplier will not be liable for discriminatory price-cutting unless he
discriminates by means of fictitious brokerage fees (§ 2(c)), or unfair promotional allowances ( 2(d)). The absurdity of this situation is apparent. Sections 2 (c) and
2(d), which were enacted to prevent evasion of § 2(a) by the use of subtle methods of
price discrimination, are ineffective in this situation because, although they would be
applicable without a showing of an interstate sale, the manufacturer could escape liability by using direct methods of price discrimination.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
52. [I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section.
15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
Section 2(f) is the only subsection directed at the large
purchasers with whom the Robinson-Patman Act was primarily concerned. The other
subsections are directed at sellers rather than buyers. It has been suggested that this
approach was motivated by constitutional considerations. RowE, supra note 8, at 23.
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language does not contain § 2(a)'s interstate sale requirement. It is
probable that courts will attempt to remedy this inconsistency by reading
the § 2(a) interstate sale requirement into § 2(f).5" Although not explicitly addressed to this inconsistency, Littlejohn resolves it in an equally
plausible manner: The court merely interpreted § 2 (a) as not requiring
an interstate sale.
The interstate sale requirement is similarly omitted from RobinsonPatman's criminal provisions in § 3:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, .

.

. to sell, or contract to sell, goods

in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in
such part of the United States. .

..

"

This omission seems to imply the anomolous result that the jurisdictional
reach of the Act's criminal provision is broader than that of its civil liability coverage, § 2(a). But the legislative history suggests that the jurisdictional scope of §§ 3 and 2(a) should be the same.5 5 Here again, the
Littlejohn approach of not interpreting § 2 (a) to include an interstate sale
requirement seems to harmonize the provisions of the Act.
CONCLUSION

Section 2(a)'s language "where either or any of the purchases involved . . . are in commerce" is unique to the Robinson-Patman Act.

The language alone might imply an additional jurisdictional requirement.
However, when read in the context of § 3 and the remainder of § 2, its
meaning is uncertain. In the past, uncertainties in the Act have been
remedied by judicial interpretation," largely because legislative amendment has been nonexistent." In these circumstances, the prime considera53. See

IC1NTNR,

supra note 3, at 80; cf. EDWARDS, supra note 37, at 486.

54. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).

55. In discussing the relationship between §§ 2(a)-(f) and § 3, the House Con-

ference Committee observed that:

While they overlap in some respects, they are in no way inconsistent with the
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The problem Littlejohn sought to correct is apparently growing.
Since the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the post-Moore decisions
the use of "local plants selling their products solely intrastate is quickly
becoming ensconced in the law as a legitimate method by which to avoid
the proscriptions of Section 2 (a)."" The Littlejohn court refused to sanction a predatory price-cutting scheme whereby a small independent retailer was driven out of business by local competition underwritten by the
economic power of a national corporation. If the basic purpose of
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unfair competitive practices, is to be achieved, the prohibitions of the
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